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Abstract
We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial
examples using information limited to loss function evaluations of input-output pairs. We use Bayesian
optimization (BO) to specifically cater to scenarios involving low query budgets to develop query efficient
adversarial attacks. We alleviate the issues surrounding BO in regards to optimizing high dimensional
deep learning models by effective dimension upsampling techniques. Our proposed approach achieves
performance comparable to the state of the art black-box adversarial attacks albeit with a much lower
average query count. In particular, in low query budget regimes, our proposed method reduces the query
count up to 80% with respect to the state of the art methods.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are now well-known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: additive perturbations that,
when applied to the input, change the network’s output classification [9]. Work investigating this lack
of robustness to adversarial examples often takes the form of a back-and-forth between newly proposed
adversarial attacks, methods for quickly and efficiently crafting adversarial examples, and corresponding
defenses that modify the classifier at either training or test time to improve robustness. The most successful
adversarial attacks use gradient-based optimization methods [9, 17], which require complete knowledge of
the architecture and parameters of the target network; this assumption is referred to as the white-box
attack setting. Conversely, the more realistic black-box setting requires an attacker to find an adversarial
perturbation without such knowledge: information about the network can be obtained only through querying
the target network, i.e., supplying an input to the network and receiving the corresponding output.
In real-world scenarios, it is extremely improbable for an attacker to have unlimited bandwidth to query a
target classifier. In evaluation of black box attacks, this constraint is usually formalized via the introduction
of a query budget : a maximum number of queries allowed to the model per input, after which an attack is
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considered to be unsuccessful. Several recent papers have proposed attacks specifically to operate in this
query-limited context [12, 11, 4, 28, 18]; nevertheless, these papers typically consider query budgets on the
order of 10,000 or 100,000. This leaves open questions as to whether black-box attacks can successfully attack
a deep network based classifier in severely query limited settings, e.g., with a query budget of 100-200. In
such a query limited regime, it is natural for an attacker to use the entire query budget, so we ask the
pertinent question: In a constrained query limited setting, can one design query efficient yet successful black
box adversarial attacks?
This work proposes a black-box attack method grounded in Bayesian optimization [13, 8], which has recently
emerged as a state of the art black-box optimization technique in settings where minimizing the number of
queries is of paramount importance. Straightforward application of Bayesian optimization to the problem
of finding adversarial examples is not feasible: the input dimension of even a small neural network-based
image classifier is orders of magnitude larger than the standard use case for Bayesian optimization. Rather,
we show that we can bridge this gap by performing Bayesian optimization in a reduced-dimension setting
and upsampling to obtain our final perturbation. We explore several upsampling techniques and find that
a relatively simple nearest-neighbor upsampling method allows us to sufficiently reduce the optimization
problem dimension such that Bayesian optimization can find adversarial perturbations with more success
than existing black-box attacks in query-constrained settings.
We compare the efficacy of our adversarial attack with a set of experiments attacking three of the most
commonly used pretrained ImageNet [7] classifiers: ResNet50 [10], Inception-v3 [27], and VGG16-bn [24].
Results from these experiments show that with very small query budgets (under 200 queries), the proposed
method Bayes-Attack achieves success rates comparable to or exceeding existing methods, and does so
with far smaller average and median query counts. Further experiments are performed on the MNIST
dataset to compare how various upsampling techniques affect the attack accuracy of our method. Given
these results we argue that, despite being a simple approach (indeed, largely because it is such a simple and
standard approach for black-box optimization), Bayesian Optimization should be a standard baseline for any
black-box adversarial attack task in the future, especially in the small query budget regime.
2 Related Work
Within the black-box setting, adversarial attacks can be further categorized by the exact nature of the infor-
mation received from a query. The most closely related work to our approach are score-based attacks, where
queries to the network return the entire output layer of the network, either as logits or probabilities. Within
this category, existing approaches draw from a variety of optimization fields and techniques. One popular
approach in this area is to attack with zeroth-order methods via some method of derivative-free gradient
estimation, as in methods proposed in Ilyas et al. [12], which uses time-dependent and data-dependent priors
to improve the estimate, as well as Ilyas et al. [11], which replaces the gradient direction found using natural
evolution strategies (NES). Other methods search for the best perturbation outside of this paradigm; Moon
et al. [18] cast the problem of finding an adversarial perturbation as a discrete optimization problem and
use local search methods to solve. These works all search for adversarial perturbations within a search space
with a hard constraint on perturbation size; other work [4, 28] incorporates a soft version of this constraint
and performs coordinate descent to decrease the perturbation size while keeping the perturbed image mis-
classified. The latter of these methods incorporates an autoencoder-based upsampling method with which
we compare in Section 5.3.1.
One may instead assume that only part of the information from the network’s output layer is received as
the result of a query. This can take the form of only receiving the output of the top k predicted classes [11],
but more often the restrictive decision-based setting is considered. Here, queries yield only the predicted
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class, with no probability information. The most successful work in this area is in [5], which reformulates the
problem as a search for the direction of the nearest decision boundary and solves using a random gradient-
free method, and in [1] and [3], both of which use random walks along the decision boundary to perform
an attack. The latter work significantly improves over the former with respect to query efficiency, but the
number of queries required to produce adversarial examples with small perturbations in this setting remains
in the tens of thousands.
A separate class of transfer-based attacks train a second, fully-observable substitute network, attack this
network with white-box methods, and transfer these attacks to the original target network. These may fall
into one of the preceding categories or exist outside of the distinction: in Papernot et al. [20], the substitute
model is built with score-based queries to the target network, whereas Liu et al. [16] trains an ensemble of
models without directly querying the network at all. These methods come with their own drawbacks: they
require training a substitute model, which may be costly or time-consuming, and overall attack success tends
to be lower than that of gradient-based methods.
Finally, there has been some recent interest in leveraging Bayesian optimization for constructing adversarial
perturbations. Bayesian optimization has played a supporting role in several methods, including Tu et al. [28],
where it is used to solve the δ-step of an alternating direction of method multipliers (ADMM) approach, and
in [6], which uses it to search within a set of procedural noise perturbations. On the other hand, prior work
in which Bayesian optimization plays a central role performs experiments only in relatively low-dimensional
problems, highlighting the main challenge of its application: Suya et al. [26] examines an attack on a spam
email classifier with 57 input features, and in Munoz-Gonza´lez [19] image classifiers are attacked but notably
do not scale beyond MNIST classifiers. In contrast to these past works, the main contribution of this paper
is to show that Bayesian Optimization presents a scalable, query-efficient approach for large-scale black-box
adversarial attacks, when combined with upsampling procedures.
3 Problem Formulation
The following notation and definitions will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. Let F be the
target neural network. We assume that F : Rd → [0, 1]K is a K-class image classifier that takes normalized
inputs: each dimension of an input x ∈ Rd represents a single pixel and is bounded between 0 and 1,
y ∈ {1, · · ·K} denotes the original label, and the corresponding output F (x) is a K-dimensional vector
representing a probability distribution over classes.
Rigorous evaluation of an adversarial attack requires careful definition of a threat model : a set of formal
assumptions about the goals, knowledge, and capabilities of an attacker [2]. We assume that, given a
correctly classified input image x, the goal of the attacker is to find a perturbation δ such that x + δ is
misclassified, i.e., arg maxk F (x + δ) 6= arg maxk F (x). We operate in the score-based black-box setting,
where we have no knowledge of the internal workings of the network, and a query to the network F yields
the entire corresponding K-dimensional output. To enforce the notion that the adversarial perturbation
should be small, we take the common approach of requiring that ‖δ‖p be smaller than a given threshold  in
some `p norm, where  varies depending on the classifier. This work considers the `∞ norm, but our attack
can easily be adapted to other norms. Finally, we denote the query budget with t; if an adversarial example
is not found after t queries to the target network, the attack fails.
As in most work, we pose the attack as a constrained optimization problem. We use an objective function
3
suggested by Carlini and Wagner [2] and used in Tu et al. [28], Chen et al. [4]:
max
δ
f(x, y, δ) subject to ‖δ‖p ≤  and (x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]d, (1)
where f(x, y, δ) =
{
max
k 6=y
log[F (x+ δ)]k − log[F (x+ δ)]y
}
.
Most importantly, the input x+ δ to f is an adversarial example for F if and only if f(x, y, δ) > 0.
We briefly note that the above threat model and objective function were chosen for simplicity and for ease
of directly comparing with other black box attacks, but the attack method we propose is compatible with
many other threat models. For example, we may change the goals of the attacker or measure δ in `1 or `2
norms instead of `∞ with appropriate modifications to the objective function and constraints in equation 1.
4 Model Framework
In this section, we present the proposed black-box attack method. We begin with a brief description of
Bayesian optimization [13] followed by its application to generate black-box adversarial examples. Finally,
we describe our method for attacking a classifier trained with high-dimensional inputs (e.g. ImageNet) in a
query-efficient manner.
4.1 Bayesian Optimization
Bayesian Optimization (BO) is a method for black box optimization particularly suited to problems with
low dimension and expensive queries. Bayesian Optimization consists of two main components: a Bayesian
statistical model and an acquisition function. The Bayesian statistical model, also referred to as the surro-
gate model, is used for approximating the objective function: it provides a Bayesian posterior probability
distribution that describes potential values for the objective function at any candidate point. This posterior
distribution is updated each time we query the objective function at a new point. The most common surro-
gate model for Bayesian optimization are Gaussian processes (GPs) [21], which define a prior over functions
that are cheap to evaluate and are updated as and when new information from queries becomes available. We
model the objective function h using a GP with prior distribution N (µ0,Σ0) with constant mean function
µ0 and Matern kernel [23, 25] as the covariance function Σ0, which is defined as:
Σ0(x,x
′) = θ20 exp(−
√
5r)
(
1 +
√
5r +
5
3
r2
)
,
r2 =
d′∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)2
θ2i
where d′ is the dimension of input and {θi}d′i=0 and µ0 are hyperparameters. We select hyperparameters that
maximize the posterior of the observations under a prior [23, 8].
The second component, the acquisition function A, assigns a value to each point that represents the utility
of querying the model at this point given the surrogate model. We sample the objective function h at
xn = arg maxxA(x|D1:n−1) where D1:n−1 comprises of n − 1 samples drawn from h so far. Although this
itself may be a hard (non-convex) optimization problem to solve, in practice we use a standard approach
and approximately optimize this objective using the LBFGS algorithm. There are several popular choices
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of acquisition function; we use expected improvement (EI) [13], which is defined as
EIn(x) = En [max (h(x)− h∗n, 0)] , (2)
where En[·] = E[·|D1:n−1] denotes the expectation taken over the posterior distribution given evaluations of
h at x1, · · · ,xn−1, and h∗n is the best value observed so far.
Bayesian optimization framework as shown in Algorithm 2 runs these two steps iteratively for the given
budget of function evaluations. It updates the posterior probability distribution on the objective function
using all the available data. Then, it finds the next sampling point by optimizing the acquisition function
over the current posterior distribution of GP. The objective function h is evaluated at this chosen point and
the whole process repeats.
In theory, we may apply Bayesian optimization directly to the optimization problem in equation 1 to obtain
an adversarial example, stopping once we find a point where the the objective function rises above 0. In
practice, Bayesian optimization’s speed and overall performance fall dramatically as the input dimension
of the problem increases. This makes running Bayesian optimization over high dimensional inputs such as
ImageNet (input dimension 3× 299× 299 = 268203) practically infeasible; we therefore require a method for
reducing the dimension of this optimization problem.
4.2 Bayes-Attack: Generating Adversarial Examples using Bayesian Optimiza-
tion
Images tend to exhibit spatial local similarity i.e. pixels that are close to each other tend to be similar. Ilyas
et al. [12] showed that this similarity also extends to gradients and used this to reduce query complexity. Our
method uses this data dependent prior to reduce the search dimension of the perturbation. We show that
the adversarial perturbations also exhibit spatial local similarity and we do not need to learn the adversarial
perturbation conforming to the actual dimensions of the image. Instead, we learn the perturbation in a much
lower dimension. We obtain our final adversarial perturbation by interpolating the learned, low-dimension
perturbation to the original input dimension.
We define the objective function for running the Bayesian optimization in low dimension in Algorithm 1. We
let ΠpB(0,) be the projection onto the `∞ ball of radius  centered at origin. Our method finds a low dimension
perturbation and upsamples to obtain the adversarial perturbation. Since this upsampled image may not
lie inside the ball of radius  centered at the origin, we project back to ensure ‖δ‖∞ remains bounded by .
With the perturbation δ in hand, we compute the objective function of the original optimization problem
defined in equation 1.
We describe the complete algorithm our complete framework in Algorithm 2 where x0 ∈ Rd and y0 ∈
{1, . . . ,K} denote the original input image and label respectively. The goal is to learn an adversarial
perturbation δ ∈ Rd′ in much lower dimension, i.e., d′ << d. We begin with a small dataset D =
{(δ1, v1), · · · , (δn0 , vn0)} where each δn is a d′ dimensional vector sampled from a given distribution and
vn is the function evaluation at δn i.e vn = Obj-Func(x0, y0, δn). We iteratively update the posterior
distribution of the GP using all available data and query new perturbations obtained by maximizing the
acquisition function over the current posterior distribution of GP until we find an adversarial perturbation or
run out of query budget. The Bayesian optimization iterations run in low dimension d′ but for querying the
model we upsample, project and then add the perturbation to the original image as shown in Algorithm 1
to get the perturbed image to conform to the input space of the model. To generate a successful adversarial
perturbation, it is necessary and sufficient to have vt > 0, as described in Section 3. We call our attack
successful with t queries to the model if the Bayesian optimization loop exits after t iterations (line 12 in
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Algorithm 1 Objective Function
1: procedure Obj-Func(x0, y0, δ)
2: //  is the given perturbation
3: δ′ ← Upsample(δ) . Upsampling low dimension perturbation to input dimension
4: δ′ ← ΠpB(0,)(δ′) . Projecting perturbation on `p-ball around x0
5: v ← f(x0, y0, δ′) . Quering the model
6: return v
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Attack using Bayesian Optimization
1: procedure Bayes-Attack(x0, y0)
2: D = {(δ1, v1), · · · , (δn0 , vn0)} . Quering randomly chosen n0 points.
3: Update the GP on D . Updating posterior distribution using available points
4: t← n0 . Updating number of queries till now
5: while t ≤ T do
6: δt ← arg maxδ A(δ | D) . Optimizing the acquisition function over the GP
7: vt ← Obj-Func(x0, y0, δ) . Querying the model
8: t← t+ 1
9: if vt ≤ 0 then
10: D ← D ∪ (δt, vt) and update the GP . Updating posterior distribution
11: else
12: return δt . Adversarial attack successful
13: return δt . Adversarial attack unsuccessful
Algorithm 2), otherwise it is unsuccessful. Finally, we note that the final adversarial image can be obtained
by upsampling the learned perturbation and adding to the original image as shown in Figure 1.
In this work, we focus on `∞-norm perturbations, where projection is defined as:
Π∞B(x0,)(x) = min {max{x0 − ,x},x0 + } , (3)
where  is the given perturbation bound. The upsampling method can be linear or non-linear. In this
work, we conduct experiments using nearest neighbor upsampling. A variational autoencoder [14] or vanilla
autoencoder could also be trained to map the low dimension perturbation to the original input space. We
compare these different upsampling schemes in Section 5.3.1. The initial choice of the dataset D to form a
prior can be done using standard normal distribution, uniform distribution or even in a deterministic manner
(e.g. with Sobol sequences).
5 Experiments
Our experiments focus on the untargeted attack setting where the goal is to perturb the original image
originally classified correctly by the classification model to cause misclassification. We primarily consider
performance of Bayes-Attack on ImageNet classifiers and compare its performance to other black-box
attacks in terms of success rate over a given query budget. We also perform ablation studies on the MNIST
dataset [15] by examining different upsampling techniques and varying the latent dimension d′ of the opti-
mization problem.
We define success rate as the ratio of the number of images successfully perturbed for a given query budget
to the total number of input images. In all experiments, images that are already misclassified by the target
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Upsampling x 0.1 +
Adversarial perturbation Original Image
Label: white wolf
Final adversarial image
Label: shower curtain
Low-dimension perturbation
Figure 1: An illustration of a black-box adversarial attack performed by the proposed method Bayes-
Attack on ResNet50 trained on ImageNet. Images from the left: first figure shows the learnt perturbation
in low dimension d′ = 972(3 × 18 × 18); second figure is the final adversarial perturbation (3 × 224 × 224)
obtained by using nearest neighbor upsampling; third figure is the original image (note that the input size for
ResNet50 is 3×224×224) which is initially classified as white/arctic wolf; last image is the final adversarial
image obtained by adding the adversarial perturbation to the original image. ResNet50 classifies the final
adversarial image as shower curtain with high probability.
network are excluded from the test set; only images that are initially classified with the correct label are
attacked. For each method of attack and each target network, we compute the average and median number
of queries used to attack among images that were successfully perturbed.
5.1 Empirical Protocols
We treat the latent dimension d′ used for running the Bayesian optimization loop as a hyperparameter. For
MNIST, we tune the latent dimension d′ over {16, 64, 100, 256, 784}. Note that 784 is the original input
dimension for MNIST. While for ImageNet, we search for latent dimension d′ and shape over the range
{48(3× 4× 4), 49(1× 7× 7), 100(1× 10× 10), 108(3× 6× 6), 400(1× 20× 20), 432(3× 12× 12), 576(1× 24×
24), 588(3×14×14), 961(1×31×31), 972(3×18×18)}. For ImageNet, the latent shapes with first dimension
as 1 indicate that the same perturbation is added to all three channels while the ones with 3 indicate that the
perturbation across channels are different. In case of ImageNet, we found that for ResNet50 and VGG16-bn
different perturbation across channels work much better than adding the same perturbation across channels.
While for Inception-v3, both seem to work equally well.
We initialize the GP with n0 = 5 samples sampled from a standard normal distribution. For all the exper-
iments in next section, we use expected improvement as the acquisition function. We also examined other
acquisition functions (posterior mean, probability of improvement, upper confidence bound) and observed
that our method works equally well with other acquisition functions. We independently tune the hyper-
parameters on a small validation set and exclude it from our final test set. We used BoTorch1 packages for
implementation.
5.2 Experiments on ImageNet
We compare the performance of the proposed method Bayes-Attack against NES [11], Bandits-td [12]
and Parsimonious [18], which is the current state of the art among score-based black-box attacks within the
1https://botorch.org/
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Figure 2: Performance comparison for `∞ untargeted attacks on ImageNet classifiers. Bayes-Attack
consistently performs better for low query budgets (≤ 200). Note that for NES, model queries are performed
in batches of 100 as specified in Ilyas et al. [11].
`∞ threat model. On ImageNet, we attack the pretrained2 ResNet50 [10], Inception-v3 [27] and VGG16-bn
[24]. We use 10,000 randomly selected images (normalized to [0, 1]) from the ImageNet validation set that
were initially correctly classified.
We set the `∞ perturbation bound  to 0.05 and evaluate the performance of all the methods for low
query budgets. We use the implementation3 and hyperparameters provided by Ilyas et al. [12] for NES
and Bandits-td. Similarly for Parsimonious, we use the implementation4 and hyperparameters given by
Moon et al. [18].
Figure 2 compares the performance of the proposed method Bayes-Attack against the set of baseline
methods in terms of success rate at different query budgets. We can see that Bayes-Attack consistently
performs better than baseline methods for query budgets < 200. Even for query budgets > 200, Bayes-
Attack achieves better success rates than Bandits-td and NES on ResNet50 and VGG16-bn. Finally, we
note that for higher query budgets (> 1000), both Parsimonious and Bandits-td method perform better
than Bayes-Attack.
To compare the success rate and average/median query, we select a point on the plots shown in Figure 2.
Table 1 compares the performance of all the methods in terms of success rate, average and median query for
a query budget of 200. We can see that Bayes-Attack achieves higher success rate with 80% less average
queries as compared to the next best Parsimonious method. Thus, we argue that although the Bayesian
Optimization adversarial attack approach is to some extent a “standard” application of traditional Bayesian
Optimization methods, the performance over the existing state of the art makes it a compelling approach
particularly for the very low query setting.
5.3 Experiments on MNIST
For MNIST, we use the pretrained network (used in Carlini and Wagner [2]) with 4 convolutional layers,
2 max-pooling layers and 2 fully-connected layers which achieves 99.5% accuracy on MNIST test set. We
2Pretrained models available at https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models
3https://github.com/MadryLab/blackbox-bandits
4https://github.com/snu-mllab/parsimonious-blackbox-attack
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Table 1 Results for `∞ untargeted attacks on ImageNet classifiers with a query budget of 200
Classifier Method
Success Average Median
Rate Query Query
ResNet50
NES 15.20% 152 200
Bandits-td 56.59% 44 20
Parsimonious 72.26% 79 73
Bayes-Attack 74.16% 17 6
Inception-v3
NES 20.27% 152 200
Bandits-td 66.44% 40 16
Parsimonious 70.75% 80 73
Bayes-Attack 81.60% 13 6
VGG16-bn
NES 16.41% 152 200
Bandits-td 62.10% 45 20
Parsimonious 60.16% 84 74
Bayes-Attack 62.95% 22 6
conduct `∞ untargeted adversarial attacks with perturbation bound  = 0.2 on a randomly sampled 1000
images from the test set. All the experiments performed on MNIST follow the same protocols.
5.3.1 Upsampling Methods
The proposed method requires an upsampling technique for mapping the perturbation learnt in the latent
dimension to the original input dimension. In this section, we examine different linear and non-linear upsam-
pling schemes and compare their performance on MNIST. The approaches we consider here can be divided
into two broad groups: Encoder-Decoder based methods and Interpolation methods. For interpolation-based
methods, we consider nearest-neighbor, bilinear and bicubic interpolation.
For encoder-decoder based approaches, we train a variational autoencoder [14, 22] by maximizing a vari-
ational lower bound on the log marginal likelihood. We also consider a simple autoencoder trained by
minimizing the mean squared loss between the generated image and the original image. For both the ap-
proaches, we run the Bayesian optimization loop in latent space and use the pretrained decoder (or generator)
for mapping the latent vector into image space. For these approaches, rather than searching for adversar-
ial perturbation δ in the latent space, we learn the adversarial image x + δ directly using the Bayesian
optimization.
Figure 3a compares the performance of different upsampling methods. We can see that Nearest Neighbor
(NN) interpolation and VAE-based decoder perform better than rest of the upsampling schemes. However,
the NN interpolation achieves similar performance to the VAE-based method but without the need of a large
training dataset which is required for accurately training a VAE-based decoder.
5.3.2 Latent Dimension Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a sensitivity analysis on the latent dimension hyperparameter d′ used for running the Bayesian
optimization. We vary the latent dimension over the range d′ ∈ {9, 16, 64, 100, 256, 784}. Figure 3b shows
the performance of nearest neighbor interpolation method for different latent dimension. We observe that
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(b) Performance comparison with different latent dimen-
sion.
Figure 3: `∞ untargeted attacks on MNIST. dim: latent dimension used to run the Bayesian optimiza-
tion, NN: Nearest neighbor interpolation, BiC: Bicubic interpolation, BiL: Bilinear interpolation, AE:
autoencoder-based decoder, VAE: VAE-based generator (or decoder)
lower latent dimensions achieve better success rates than the original input dimension d′ = 784 for MNIST.
This could be because with increase in search dimension, Bayesian optimization needs more queries to find
successful perturbation. We also note that for the case of latent dimension d′ = 9, Bayes-Attack achieves
lower success rates which could mean that it is hard to find adversarial perturbations in such low dimension.
6 Conclusions
We considered the problem of black-box adversarial attacks in settings involving constrained query bud-
gets. We employed Bayesian optimization based method to construct a query efficient attack strategy. The
proposed method searches for an adversarial perturbation in low dimensional latent space using Bayesian
optimization and then maps the perturbation to the original input space using the nearest neighbor upsam-
pling scheme. We successfully demonstrated the efficacy of our method in attacking multiple deep learning
architectures for high dimensional inputs. Our work opens avenues regarding applying BO for adversarial
attacks in high dimensional settings.
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